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Catherine S. Herfeld
The Motive of Commitment and Its Implications
for Rational Choice Theory
Abstract: This paper addresses the explanatory role of the concept of a motive for
action in economics. The aim of the paper is to show the diﬃculty economists have
to accommodate the motive of commitment into their explanatory and predictive fra-
mework, i.e. rational choice theory. One diﬃculty is that the economists' explanation
becomes analytic when assuming preferences of commitment. Another diﬃculty is that
it is highly doubtful whether commitment can be represented by current frameworks
while (pre-)serving the `folk-psychological' idea of what is commonly understood by the
idea of a commitment. Both diﬃculties lead to the conclusion that, although motives
do matter, conceptualizing the motive of commitment would cause trouble for rational
choice theory.
0. Introduction
This paper presents a critique of the behavioural foundations of rational choice
theory (hereafter RCT). RCT is based on the idea that preferences and not real
motives describe behaviour. We ask, however, whether people's motives could
and should occupy a central role in explanations and predictions of individual
and social behaviour. This question is discussed by focussing on the motive of
commitment and its importance to explain norm-conformity. Thereby, making
choices based on one's commitments comes to be understood as a matter of
making choices irrespective of any personal gain or loss (Davis 2004, 4). The
paper analyses the potential role of commitment as a concept in explaining
and predicting behaviour. It discusses the diﬃculties and potential implications
of conceptualizing such a motive for RCT.1 The paper concludes that motives
1 Note that we are not making any claims here about the origins of human motives,
nor are we concerned with their cognitive or neurological character. When we talk about
motives in this paper, we are referring to our commonsense understandings of motives as
the activators of behaviour directed towards certain goals. A human motive is understood
in various psychological theories as being attributed to speciﬁc reasons a person holds; thus,
having a reason motivates an action. The nature of such reasons can be manifold. They can
be traced back to desires such as being hungry which provides a reason to eat something.
But motivation can also be attributed to less apparent reasons such as morality, altruism or
personal commitments. In this case, a commitment provides the agent with a reason to act
which is diﬀerent in nature than more obvious sources such as bodily desires; the diﬀerence
manifests itself in the behavioural pattern they bring about.
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matter for explanation and prediction. However, conceptualizing a motive of
commitment already presents a challenge for the rational choice theorist.
We will place this critique in the context of the work of Nobel-prize-winning
economist Amartya Sen, especially focusing on his contributions to the discussi-
ons on the limitations and explanatory shortcomings of classical economic theory
since the 1970s. In his famous paper Rational Fools (1977), Sen started ques-
tioning the two main requirements for rational agency: ﬁrst, he criticized the
basic consistency axioms required to be fulﬁlled by the agent's preference ran-
king. Second, he questioned the assumption of maximization that constitutes
standard RCT, i.e. that a rational agent must always choose the most preferred
option available to him.2 Thereby, Sen initiated a debate about the status and
role of RCT and its potential shortcomings to accommodate behaviour motiva-
ted in fundamentally diﬀerent ways. His work on commitment raises questions
concerning the extension or rejection of RCT as an explanatory and predicti-
ve tool in the social sciences.3 It also continues to inﬂuence discussions about
questions such as whether RCT should be interpreted as an explanatory and/or
a normative framework for accounting for human behaviour. As there has been
more controversy than agreement upon these issues, Sen's work remains highly
relevant in the social sciences and especially in economics down to the present
day.
1. Background
In recent years, a lot of theoretical and empirical research has been conducted to
explain diﬀerent kinds of human behaviour by social scientiﬁc models based on
the standard economic view of RCT. Many objections have been raised against
the theory and its usefulness and status has been discussed endlessly. The picture
drawn by the economist of the Homo Economicus, a utility-maximizer who is
only motivated by the aim of satisfying his own preferences has been highly
criticized as being one-sided and narrow in scope when it comes to explaining
human behaviour in its entirety, especially with regard to cooperation and pro-
social behaviour. While the theory predicted defection and free-riding, empirical
results in experimental settings of the ultimatum-, the dictator-, the trust- and
the prisoner's dilemma-game showed that individuals systematically cooperate at
the expense of increasing their personal utility. So, one main objection, especially
2 As will be discussed later in the paper, this requirement directly relates to the underlying
concept of motivation in RCT; the satisfaction of one's own preferences motivates the agent.
Doing this is assumed to be in the interest of the agent.
3 The most recent work discussing these issues is a book edited by Fabienne Peter and
Hans Bernhard Schmid entitled Rationality and Commitment published in 2007 by Oxford
University Press. It presents a collection of essays written by economists and philosophers
for a workshop hosted at the University of St. Gallen in May 2004, addressing issues such
as committed action, the concept of rationality in economics and the role of identity and
(collective) intentions for economic theory in the context of Sen's work. An earlier reference
to discussions on the motive of commitment and the diﬃculties of rational choice theory are
papers of the `Symposium on Sen's philosophy', published in the Journal Economics and
Philosophy 17(1). The content of both publications partly overlap.
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raised by behavioural decision theorists, was that models based on traditional
RCT could not accommodate this data (Camerer/Fehr 2002; Fehr/Fischbacher
2004).
Facing this objection, a variety of reductionist arguments have been given
(Jolls/Sunstein/Thaler 1998). Economists have extended the key concepts of
constraints, preferences, and utility in their `as-if-approach'. They broaden their
understandings of the assumptions of maximization and self-interested prefe-
rences. They allowed for other kinds of preferences to accommodate behaviour
originating from a variety of motives.4
In the same line, there has been a recent trend in the social sciences to explain
behavior by referring to the existence of a social norm, which guides people's be-
haviour and motivates them to cooperate in certain (social) settings.5 This seems
plausible; empirical data is indicative of the fact that people conform to social
norms to interact with others. Fairness, reciprocity, and promise-keeping enable
or enhance cooperation amongst the members of a given group or society. Norms
are supposed to be solutions to market failures and to collective action problems
(e.g. the free-rider-problem) (Arrow 1971; Ostrom 2000; Coleman 1990; Ellick-
son 1994). Consequently, despite the problem that social norms are generally a)
hard to measure and b) only vaguely understood in terms of their actual inﬂu-
ence on people's behaviour, they have been increasingly acknowledged by social
scientists and economists alike. In the case of economists, manifold attempts ha-
ve been made to integrate norm-conformity into the rational-choice framework
and its concepts (e.g. Akerlof 1982; Bicchieri 2006; Conlin et al. 2003; Coleman,
1990; Fehr/Fischbacher 2004; Henrich 2000; Basu/Weibull 2003; Kahneman et
al. 1986; Lindbeck et al. 1999; Elster 1989). Hence, social norms play an increa-
singly signiﬁcant role in the explanation and prediction of cooperation in all the
social sciences. The wide acknowledgement of a social norm as a concept and the
extensive experimental literature on norm-conformity makes norm-conformity a
good example for evaluating the behavioural foundations of RCT, for analysing
the explanatory role of motives and for discussing the diﬃculties and implicati-
ons of something like commitment as a potential motivating force for behaviour
such as norm-conformity.
The works of Bicchieri (2006) and of many other scholars in this ﬁeld have
to be acknowledged as highly inﬂuential and insightful. However, one can ask
whether models based on RCT can provide useful and extensive explanations for
all kinds of individual and pro-social behaviour. This question arises, because,
independently of the characteristics of whatever motive assumed, all actions ex-
4 Besides self-interest in which case a positively monotonic utility for one's own material
payoﬀs and indiﬀerence about others' material payoﬀs is assumed, they acknowledged other-
regarding or social preferences that are characterized by utility that is not constant with respect
to variations in one's own or others' material payoﬀs (Fehr/Fischbacher 2002). For example,
altruistic preferences are characterized by utility that is monotonically increasing in others'
material payoﬀs and one's own payoﬀs; and emotions can be modelled as positive or negative
internal sanctions, which aﬀect the utility function of the agent in the form of psychic costs or
beneﬁts (Elster 1998).
5 We will call this behaviour norm-guided behaviour here. It should not be confused with
cooperative behaviour in general, although in many cases by following social norms, people
can be said to cooperate with each other.
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plained by RCT are ultimately reduced to instrumental agency. In the end, the
agent is always assumed to seek the satisfaction of his own preferences.6 And
it is its speciﬁc character which provides us with another reason why `norm-
conformity' serves as a good example to evaluate RCT as an explanatory and
predictive tool: we think that norm-conformity can have an instrumental, but
also a normative dimension. This is because social norms not only provide so-
lutions to problems of cooperation. Social norms also make prescriptions about
acceptable and inacceptable behaviour within a group or society. We believe that,
depending on the motives a person has (e.g. cognitive motives such as commit-
ment or duty and non-cognitive motives such as emotions),7 actual actions are
instrumental and/or normative in character. And we think that, in contrast to
the `instrumental dimension' which is well captured by RCT, it is the `normative
dimension' that has not yet been successfully accommodated within RCT.
2. Line of Argument
Having this background in mind, ﬁrstly, we argue that there is a dimension to
agency that is heavily underestimated by RCT, which is what we will call the
`normative dimension' of agency. By this we mean that human beings are ab-
le to consider and reﬂect on what they ought to do, independently of whether
this ought springs from an internal judgment about right or wrong (behaviour)
or whether it has its origin in the expectations and judgments on the part of
society. This normative dimension requires the ability to consciously adopt and
abide by certain norms and thereby to distance oneself from one's own bundle
of preferences. This requires as person to have the capacity to undertake judg-
ments about right or wrong, independent from immediate desires or inclinations.
It requires to base or adjust one's choices and actions on these judgments and
to have the capacity of self-determination/formation, self-control and ultimate-
ly of forming one's (personal and social) identity, and perform actions in line
with these judgments. The economic perspective denies and even contradicts
6 In this paper, the concept of welfare directly relates to the satisfaction of personal pre-
ferences and utility. This view of welfare is also called preference satisfaction view (Haus-
man/McPherson 2006, 120). It takes utility-maximization as leading to welfare-improvement.
However, the two concepts of individual utility and welfare should generally not be confused
with one another or considered as synonymous. In the case of social or altruistic preferences,
an individual can maximize his individual utility by satisfying his altruistic preference which
improves, however, the welfare of another person. In the case of social preferences, the im-
provement of social welfare is the result of satisfying individual preferences. Consequently,
maximizing personal utility by satisfying individual preferences does not necessarily imply the
improvement of personal welfare.
7 The classiﬁcation of motives as well as their typologisation depends on the kind of
psychological theory one want to adopt. For reasons of simpliﬁcation, we will make the rather
amateurish claim that there are three types of motivational sources under which many motives
can be subsumed; that is self-interest, emotions, and what the person voluntarily chooses to
on his or her better judgment against his or her immediate inclinations (e.g. doing s.th. out
of duty, commitment). This goes in a similar direction as Mansbridge 1998. She distinguishes
between narrow and wide self-interest, duty and love as the three main types of driving forces
behind human behaviour which bring about distinct patterns of behavior.
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this dimension. However, this normative dimension of agency can be essential
in motivating individual and pro-social action. We argue that being able to ex-
plain why people keep conforming to social norms over long periods of time,
why they vote or stick to religious practices even if their potential beneﬁt re-
mains completely uncertain requires taking seriously people's motives beyond
preference-satisfaction and utility-improvement. We suggest that the motive of
commitment, famously characterized by Amartya Sen (1977) and later develo-
ped in a more sophisticated way by other scholars (Peter/Schmid 2007), could
help us capturing the normative dimension of agency and the type of motivation
behind such behavior, here norm-conformity.
Secondly, the underlying rationale of making decisions based on one's judg-
ments is the idea of maximization and the satisfaction of individual preferences
in RCT. However, the rationale for choices which have a normative dimension
is shaped by what the agent values rather than by what he prefers. We argue
that therefore a motive of commitment cannot be conceptualized within the RC-
framework and that the RC-perspective rather contradicts this idea. Economists
have suggested assuming an unconditional preference for complying with com-
mitments or modelling commitment as constraint on the utility-function. Howe-
ver, according to the common `axiomatic interpretation' of RCT and the theory
of revealed preferences accompanied with it, this entails indeed a mathemati-
cal formulation, but does not provide us with empirically testable hypotheses
and causal relationships.8 Assuming a preference as explanans for the behavior
we want to explain, i.e. the explanandum, this leads to the analyticity of our
statements rather than to proposing testable hypotheses. This again weakens the
explanatory and predictive power of RCT and invites for questioning its status
as a useful tool in scientiﬁc research.9 Modelling commitment as constraint on
the utility-function can be rejected on the grounds that we want our concepts
to preserve, at least approximately, our `folk-psychological' idea of what is com-
monly understood as a commitment and the nature of an action commitments
bring about. Hence, the motive of commitment cannot be accommodated by
RCT.
However, it is argued in this paper that it is important to distinguish between
varieties of motive-types when we take RCT as an explanatory tool; they are
distinct in the sense that they bring about diﬀerent behavioural patters. Hence,
in order to get adequate explanations of individual and social behaviour and
make reliable predictions, the distinct nature of motives has to be acknowled-
ged. By integrating other-regarding preferences and emotions into RCT a ﬁrst
8 Heiner makes the point that the ultimate extension of the RC-view is not that agents
maximize, i.e. select the most preferred options/actions but rather that any observed behavior
is consistent with the maximization of some function (1983, 561). The latter is incapable of
theoretical or empirical disproof (Boland 1981); it is rather a mathematical fact and thereby
diﬃcult to reject on solid grounds.
9 We adopt Sen's view of a `useful explanation' in this context. He argues that scientists
do neither aim at an assumption structure [within a theory] which is fundamentally at odds
with the real world, nor at one where simplicity takes the form of naivety (Sen 1987). This
diﬀers from an instrumentalist picture were the behavioural assumptions can be unrealistic
insofar as the theory provides good predictions.
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important step has been already made. The concept of commitment would be a
further motivational force which would help to account for the normative dimen-
sion of agency in individual and social life. If RCT would access something like
a typology of the most important motives, we will attain a better understanding
of the role motivation plays in the explanation of human behaviour.
To develop our argument we shall ﬁrst recapitulate what RCT is and how
RCT is used to explain why people (think they ought to) follow a social norm.
We will tackle the question of what the nature of normativity involved in norm-
conformity is and how it relates to motivation. We conclude that such behaviour
can have two dimensions, an instrumental and a normative one, whereby the
latter has diﬃculties to be accommodated in models based on RCT. By pro-
viding a characterization of the motive of commitment, we will show why a
conceptualization of such a motive could play a role in accounting for the nor-
mative dimension of agency in cases we want to account for this behavior. We
will then show the diﬃculties of including such a concept of commitment into
models based on RCT. Finally, we examine the conceptual and methodological
implications of acknowledging the concept of commitment.
3. Rational Choice Theory as an Explanatory Framework
To address the question of whether people's motives could and should occupy
a central role in RC-explanations and predictions, we have to understand how
behavior in general and norm-conformity in particular is explained by models
based on RCT and what the economist considers a social norm to be.
3.1 Introducing Rational Choice Theory
As its name suggests, the basic idea of RCT is that human beings choose ra-
tionally. Speciﬁcally, the framework is based on the behavioural assumption of
instrumental rationality, i.e. the agent's sole motive for action is assumed to lie
in the satisfaction of personal preferences at the expense of other possible mo-
tivations (Sen 1985). Individual preferences as well as individuals' beliefs about
speciﬁc events are given. The intuitive principle of a rational choice is that in-
dividual agents choose those actions which they expect will have the best con-
sequences for them, given their beliefs and desires. Putting this idea in a more
formal principle of rational choice, it states that rational agents choose the acti-
on with maximum subjective expected utility.10 The idea behind both principles
10 The term `utility' is often seen as representing the person's welfare or well-being (Sen
2002, 27). This is misleading in at least two ways: ﬁrst, it sounds as if the agent is rational in
the moment he aims at maximizing his personal welfare in the ﬁrst place. It suggests a selﬁsh
agent, who is only focused on what lies in his immediate personal interests (his self-interest),
or personal welfare, and what is in his interest only relates to himself. Interest in other people,
as the word `self' already implies, is excluded on this interpretation. Second, welfare often gets
confused in the literature with the deﬁnition of `utility' as the maximand of a person's choice
behavior that is inspired by the theory of revealed preferences (Sen 2002, 27). But in ordering
his preferences the agent is assumed to attach utility to the options, not `welfare-units'.
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is that choosing rationally entails choosing the option, or a strategy in game
theory, which will best satisfy the individual's preferred ends, given a ﬁnite set
of alternatives (or, in game theory, a given choice situation). What best satisﬁes
the agent's preference is the option that has the greatest utility to the agent.
Consequently, a performed behavior is a form of optimizing behavior, taken to
satisfy the agent's personal preferences and thereby maximize individual utility
(Elster 1989).11
3.2 Intentional Explanation
When rational choice theorists explain action, they focus on observable beha-
viour. This is because, according to the standard economic reasoning, we cannot
observe people's motivation for performing a certain action. What goes on in peo-
ple's heads is taken to be inaccessible and the true motivational force remains
obscure. The economist's explanation is rather based upon what he generally as-
sumes to be characteristic for a motive of action. Motivation is grounded on the
concept of intentional action used in folk psychology. An intentional action is a
piece of behaviour which derives from the intention of the individual exhibiting
it (Elster 1994, 311). If an agent acts instrumentally rational, that agent's inten-
tion is what is assumed to be motivating that very action. The intention of the
agent is represented by a reason an agent holds for the performance of an action
to achieve a certain goal. This is what distinguishes action from mere behaviour
in RCT, namely that it is always done with a purpose (e.g. Anscombe 1957;
Rosenberg 1995). Reasons are modelled as being provided by mental states, i.e.
the desire to do something and the belief that a certain action serves as a means
to satisfy this desire (Elster 1994; Hausman 2005; Rosenberg 1995). For the eco-
nomist, the motive for an action is thus taken to be identiﬁed by providing a
reason, i.e. a desire and a belief which the agent had to perform an action. The
observed behaviour is the resulting outcome or eﬀect of a causal process between
two events, the reason and the corresponding action. So the motivational struc-
ture of an action is assumed as causal in nature when providing an explanation
11 This is a very delicate point that often gets confused and thereby leads to misunderstan-
dings and false interpretations of the concept of rational choice. The agent does not aim at
maximizing utility in the ﬁrst place. He is motivated to act because he wants to satisfy his
preferences. And because the agent prefers one option x1 to another x2, the utility of x1 is
higher than the utility of x2, not vice versa. And this is why, in choosing x1, the agent also gets
the highest utility, namely U1. So, utility-maximization is not the reason for his action but a
consequence of his individual preference-ordering. As preferences cannot be observed but we
assume that the agent takes the option he most prefers, we infer some information about the
nature of agent's preferences from the observed choice. This view provides the basis for the
well-known view of revealed preferences (Samuelson 1938; Sen 1977).
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(Davidson 1963).12 The observed behaviour is then explained by attributing a
reason as its cause.13
In the vocabulary of standard RCT, the desires of the person are translated
into a preference-set. The beliefs a person holds are taken to be the set of infor-
mation available to the agent. Formally, preferences are represented by a utility
function and beliefs are represented in terms of a probability distribution; this
is in case that it is assumed that the agent does not have full information about
the consequences of all options available to him. To evaluate or choose the right
means to achieve his ends, the agent is assumed to have a rank ordering of the
options available to him according to his preferences. They are measured in terms
of `utility' and the ordering is represented by the (expected) utility attached by
the agent to the diﬀerent (material or immaterial) outcomes. Aiming at the satis-
faction of his preferences, he chooses the option which is assumed to provide him
with the highest (expected) utility and acts accordingly, given his preferences
and information available. The results of the actions are the objects of desires or,
better say, objectives that satisfy the agents' preferences in the best possible way.
Accordingly, the satisfaction of preferences is assumed to always be the person's
main end and is therefore said to be in his/her self-interest (Hargreaves-Heap
et al. 1992). The limited empirical basis for unobservable preferences or desires
does not present a problem in this context. Instead, it is simply claimed that
the observed action reveals the preference. And preferences reveal the motivati-
ons involved. According to this understanding, diﬀerent preferences (re-)present
diﬀerent motives; and as preferences are given in economic theory, motives are
not something the economist is concerned about.
Note that there is an abundance of literature on the topic that has spaw-
ned a variety of very diﬀerent interpretations and uses of RCT.14 Therefore, it
is diﬃcult to pin down exactly what has been and what can be legitimately
12 Note that it remains opaque and also irrelevant for the explanation in this picture what
the ultimate reason of a person is. This relates to an often raised point against the view that
motives should matter. It is often claimed that ﬁnding out about people's motivation is too
diﬃcult; that even the person himself might not be able to identify what really motivated
him. Or that there might be a chain of reasons which jointly caused the action in question
(Rosenberg 1995).
13 In the RC-literature, there is no diﬀerence made between choosing a course of action or
choosing an option and the actual performance of an action. It is assumed that the choice of
the agent based on his preferences necessarily leads to the performance of an action or that the
choice is the actual action. This is not obvious but cannot be discussed here. However, what
matters later in the paper is that a choice which I would make based on my preferences does not
lead to the appropriate behaviour, because what my preferences dictate can conﬂict with the
course of action that my commitments dictate. And because I want to act on my commitments
I perform an action in line with my commitment rather than performing an action that would
satisfy my preferences. This is one reason why RCT has problems to accommodate committed
action. Commitment separates choice from utility-maximization and preference-satisfaction.
This is important and we will come back to this aspect later on in the paper.
14 Bunge (1996) makes some attempts to disentangle the various versions of RCT and the
various interpretations of its concepts. For example he ﬁnds more than 10 interpretations of
the concept of rationality made within the context of rational choice theory. He claims that
rather than being one theoretical framework, RCT rather consists of a family of theoretical
models and concepts. He also highlights the diﬀerences between contemporary rational choice
theories and their precursors. This should give a very rough idea of how diverse the diﬀerent
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subsumed under the label of RCT in the social sciences; and to what extend
social scientists' objections to RCT as it was originally conceived in economics
applies today. Even in mainstream economics, the term `rational choice' has be-
en used in many diﬀerent ways.15 However, at least since the 1950s, `rational
choice' has been associated with a set of core axioms that describe it as being
a consistent choice. A consistent choice requires a set of apriori conditions of
internal consistency to be fulﬁlled by the agent's observable choices in diﬀerent
situations where the agent chooses between diﬀerent menus, i.e. diﬀerent sets of
options available to him. The exact consistency-requirements can vary, but the
standard ones relate to the idea that a set of actual choices can be explained as
resulting from maximization according to some binary relation which represents
the choice function or utility function of the agent (Sen 1987). This relation
is required to be transitive, reﬂexive and complete. However, consistency alone
does not imply any kind of normativity of the agent's intentions. It does not
entail that either the performed action has valuable content for the agent besi-
des fulﬁlling its instrumental role or that the end is perceived as right in a more
profound sense (Raz 2004)right in the sense that the agent judges it so. The
normativity involved is of an instrumental nature. If an agent is rational, he has
to choose according to what his preferences dictate. There is no space for the
agent considering the action itself as worth pursuing, independently of the fact
that it satisﬁes his personal preferences. What the agent chooses as the right
action is assumed to result exclusively from a judgment based on the rationale
of preference-satisfaction and maximization. This can be taken as the standard
framework of RCT.
3.3 Rational Choice Theory and the Concept of a Social Norm
There is no uniﬁed deﬁnition of a social norm used by social scientists (Hech-
ter/Opp 2001; Stout 2001; Okruch 1999). However, there are some key features
or properties generally considered to be common to social norms. First, social
norms are characterized as informal rules of behaviour that people follow for
some reason other than the fear of legal sanctions (Stout 2001, 6). This means
schools of thought of the diﬀerent social sciences are when it comes to break RCT down into
one category.
15 The picture we have just outlined here refers to Amartya Sen's view, who claims that
RCT can be identiﬁed with a specialized school of thought (2002, 11). This school represents
the standard view of modern economic theory that social scientists have in mind when they
refer to the concept of rational choice in the context of RCT, game theory, and decision theory.
Depending on the interpretation of concepts such as desires/preferences, constraints, utility,
rationality and decision/choice, which additional assumptions are accepted and for which pur-
pose they are being used, the underlying notion of rational choice can change dramatically
in both meaning and character. However, rationality as internal consistency that is secured
by the fulﬁlment of these very abstract axioms, allows for a high ﬂexibility in interpreting its
concepts. But very frequently, economic models still assume that individuals are self-regarding.
Take for example consumer theory, which assumes that individuals do not care what others
are consuming but only making choices on the basis of what the individual himself prefers.
Besides that, RCT is also not committed to any particular explanation of the origin of an
agent's preferences and especially to a position on whether these preferences have social or
biological roots.
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that they are not externally enforced by formal rules, such as legal norms, nor
through coercion. Instead, they are usually enforced by informal sanctions exe-
cuted by third parties, e.g. such as the exclusion from a social group by its
members (Mantzavinos 2001). Or the norm is enforced by mechanisms internal
to the agent, i.e. negative or positive sanctions. This is in case he feels a strong
obligation to conform to the norm, because he internalized it through the process
of socialization, but does not prefer to do that, in which case the transgression
will cause negative feelings such as guilt.
But social norms do not have to be enforced at all. Social norms can become
part of our system of values (Bicchieri 2006). In this case, the agent wants to act
in line with the norm as he values what the social norm embodies. For example,
in the case of fairness, the agent consciously may want to conform to the norm
of fairness, i.e. to share equally because he values fairness and because this is
what the norm stands for. Another feature is that social norms are `social' in
the sense that they are public, shared and accepted by the members of a group
or society (Hechter/Opp 2001; Fehr/Fischbacher 2004). Although the speciﬁc
set of norms can diﬀer cross-culturally, social norms are assumed to exist in
every society, every subgroup of society and any kind of organisational structure
(Kirchgässner 2006).
In the RC-literature, social norms are often functionally deﬁned by the inte-
rest they serve (Hardin 2008). The motivation for norm-conformity is modelled
as deriving from people's preferences. The agent has a certain end he wants to
achieve and he considers conformity to a speciﬁc social norm as the best means to
achieve this desired end within his set of options. On this view, norm-conformity
is interpreted as a form of optimizing behaviour; it is assumed to be behaviour
performed to satisfy one's preferences and thereby maximize individual utility
(Elster 1989). Conformity then involves choice from the agent's part; the utility
of the agent is directly aﬀected and it is contingent upon the agent's preferred
goals. Hence, if the preferences of the agent change or if the agent has a more
eﬃcient means to satisfy his preferences, he may substitute norm-conformity by
a diﬀerent course of action. Norms of etiquette may increase an agent's chances
for getting a job in a prestigious ﬁrm, the achievement of which would satisfy
the agent's preference for that job. The goal of getting a job motivates the agent,
to follow the norms of etiquette. Avoiding (informal) costs of sanctions expected
by the agent in the case of transgression can also satisfy the agents preferences;
in this case, personal utility is indirectly aﬀected through (positive or negative)
emotions or external but informal (positive or negative) sanctioning in case of
conformity or deviation respectively.
On this view, social norms are in a way to be (value-)neutral (Hardin 2008).
The normativity involved in such norm-conformity, i.e. the reason why people
think they ought to follow a social norm, is purely instrumental in character. An
instrumentally rational agent thinks he `ought' to follow a social norm because
it is in his interest to do so. His internal motivating source for conformity rests
on a prudential oras we would call it`instrumental reason' to obey the norm
The Motive of Commitment and Its Implications 301
(Opp 1999; Coleman 1990).16 In the following we will refer to `instrumental
normativity' or the `instrumental dimension of agency' in this context.17
In contrast to this view, imagine that what is pro- or prescribed by social
norms can conﬂict with what one's own preferences dictate in a given situation.
Conformity can be motivated by a goal that does not satisfy one's preferences
and utility-maximization. This is why often some additional motives are requi-
red to be in place to make social norms eﬃcacious. Norm-conformity can have
many diﬀerent motivational sources. Emotions or commitment can play a crucial
role in norm-conformity (Elster 1989; Mansbridge 1998; Zimbardo et al. 1996).
We suggest in the following section that the normativity involved in the norm-
conformity can fundamentally diﬀer from instrumental normativity described
above. Whether or not it diﬀers depends on the motivation a person has for
conforming to social norms.
4. Two Dimensions of Behavior and the Explanatory
Role of Motives
In this paper, we are concerned with the behavioural foundations of RCT. Ori-
ginating from economics, RCT is a framework that is extensively used in all the
social sciences to account for a variety of behaviour in diﬀerent social settings.
However, we have indicated that RCT cannot be used to explain all kinds of
behaviour. To justify this claim, we have suggested to analyze norm-conformity
as one example of behaviour where RC-explanations are sometimes questionable.
To do that, we have introduced social norms and how they are characterized in
the literature and we have outlined how a RC-explanation of norm-conformity
would look like. We also have seen that RCT makes methodological assumpti-
ons of universal and objective scientiﬁc laws about human behaviour based on
speciﬁc consistency-requirements; it draws a picture which favours individualism
and takes rationality to be instrumental in nature. The two main assumptions
about rationality underlying RCT are ﬁrst, that behavior is outcome-orientated
(in terms of maximization) and consequentialist in nature. Second, behavior is
assumed to be instrumental in character which basically means that an action is
16 Bicchieri deﬁnes a prudential reason for action as if you have a goal x and the best
available means to attain x is a course of action y, then you ought to adopt y (2006, 14). This
is similar of having what we called `instrumental reason' as an instrumentally rational agent.
17 Note that normativity is not an issue which can be clearly contrasted with instrumental.
Actions which have the instrumental dimension we are talking about here can also be taken as
normative in character. The normativity involved in an instrumental action derives from the
rational choice theorist's understanding of rationality as being instrumental in character. On
this view, the normativity involved in an instrumental action, i.e. why a rational agent ought
to take one rather than another action is independent of any talk about values. It is rather
determined by the conditions of how instrumental rationality is deﬁned in RCT. However, this
is diﬀerent from the normativity involved in an action which has this normative dimension
stated above. What we mean by normative here (in contrast to instrumental) is that when
an action has to be taken because there are prescriptions/proscriptions of a norm external or
internal to the agent but which provide the agent with independent reasons which he accepts or
endorses or which are in line of what the agent himself considers as right/wrong, independent
of he is concerned about in this situation.
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performed just because it is a means to achieve another goal. Both assumptions
also hold for explaining norm-conformity on this view. However, we have also
indicated, that social norms pro- or prescribe actions which can conﬂict with
what individual preferences dictate in a given situation.
RCT seems to contradict this normative dimension of agency. Three questions
require an answer: when does behaviour have this normative dimension and why
is such a ﬂexible approach not be able to account for it? And if so, what could
we do about this `explanatory gap'? In the following, let us look at each of these
questions in turn. But ﬁrst let us understand what we mean by the normative
dimension of behaviour by exemplarily looking at norm-conformity.
4.1 The Normative Dimension of Social Norms
We want to say that the underlying problem of explaining norm-conformity with
RCT is that norm-conformity seems to involve an instrumental and a norma-
tive dimension. What does that mean? A quick look over the literature allows
us to pick out overlapping notions such as `expectations', `obligatory', `value-
judgments', `right' or `wrong' and `authoritative' when it comes to deﬁning so-
cial norms (Anderson 2000; Bicchieri 2006; Coleman 1987; Elster 1989; Hech-
ter/Opp 2001). These normative notions suggest a type of normativity attached
to norm-conformity which imposes requirements on supposedly rational beha-
viour that are diﬀerent from the minimal consistency-requirement postulated
by RC-models. From this point of view, norm-conformity is neither regarded as
being a mere regularity of behaviour.18 Nor is it considered to be completely
contingent, either upon people's preferences and expected utilities, or upon the
usefulness of the norm in a given situation.19 Instead, social norms are often
taken as more or less stable prescriptions that establish how one ought to be-
have within a community (Woodward 2009, 33, my italics). They are deﬁned
as standards of behaviour that are based on widely shared beliefs how individu-
al group members ought to behave in a given situation within the community
(Fehr/Fischbacher 2004, 185, my italics). They are said to reinforce certain pat-
terns of behaviour [...] by representing these patterns as desirable or obligatory
within a community (Pettit 1990, 725, my italics). In this sense, a social norm
is a rule prescribing or proscribing behaviour; a rule that can be represented by
a statement of the form of a conditional, hypothetical imperative `in situation
X, you ought to do Y'. In this case, they are conditional upon the circumstances
and not, as instrumental rationality assumes, exclusively on outcomes. Or they
have the form of an unconditional, categorical imperative `you should (not) do
18 Bicchieri (2006) contrasts social norms with descriptive norms such as fashions and fads,
whereas the latter are mere regularities which can be observed. According to Bicchieri and in
line with my argument, what classiﬁes collective behaviour as a descriptive or a social norm
is a) the motives of the people involved and b) the expectations of the people within the
community.
19 There is a lot of empirical evidence that conformity of an individual varies from situation
to situation. But it seems undeniable that which kind of social norm is being used in a speciﬁc
context is stable over time and counts for every individual equally. Table manners are supposed
to be conformed to for example when people have dinner together. This is not to say that each
individual does follow the appropriate norm in this situation.
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X' in which case an individual conforms to a social norm for the sake of the norm
independent of the consequences (Elster 1989, 98). The non-consequentialist cha-
racter, the conformity for the sake of the norm itself or for what the norm stands,
and the conformity independently of individual preferences are aspects that are
meant to be captured by the `normative dimension of agency'.
We claim that whether or not behaviour has a normative dimension in the
abovementioned sense depends on people's motivation of their behavior. People's
motives for conformity can be manifold (e.g. Bicchieri 2006; Camerer/Fehr 2002).
People conform to social norms because they fear what others would say in case
of transgression. People want to live up to other people's expectations, or they
do not even know that they conform to norms; they often just internalized them
and follow them unconsciously in form of a habit or custom (Bicchieri 2006).
These types of behaviour are instrumental in kind; here, conformity has a goal
that is diﬀerent from conformity itself, but which is preferred by an individual.
Achieving his goal presents the agent with a reason to conform to the norm.
Sometimes, however, individuals consider the conformity to social norms as
normative for them, because of what the social norm embodies; they are motiva-
ted to conform to the norm because they think that the norm supports bringing
about the appropriate kind of behaviour. Especially social norms of cooperation
such as promise-keeping, fairness, truth-telling and reciprocity are operative by
supporting value-laden patterns; they align people's behaviours with their va-
lues. And we often, we follow the norm to live up to what we take as valuable.
If fairness is considered as valuable by an individual, it takes the norm of fair
sharing as the right thing to do as the norm reﬂects what he values. Conformity
does not serve as the best means to attain the optimal outcome for the indivi-
dual in a given situation. It is rather that the individual values fairness and this
provides him with a reason to follow the norm, independent of his personal goals
and potential instrumental reasons the agent can also have. He follows the norm
even if conformity causes him to be personally worse oﬀ.
This is so because social norms often set standards of behaviour which are
derived from an accepted set of values.20 They are standards that provide a
basis for individual judgments of options in a choice situation.21 Social norms
often represent or embody what people value in a society. And people want to
align their values with their behaviour and social norms can serve this function
in case they embody a value the agent himself holds (Wallace et al. 2004). This
is on reason why they often use the social norm as an underlying rationale to
20 These values can be for example social, cultural, moral etc..
21 These standards, i.e. the social norms themselves, have to be at least `passively' approved
of, if not actively ratiﬁed, enforced and followed as well as implemented by the individual.
`Passively approved of' in this context means that the existence of a norm is accepted even
if people avoid situations where the conformity to a social norm would have been expected,
like the example of the hunter-gatherer community of the Ik's shows (Turnbull 1972). Thus,
even if people do not follow the social norm, its existence is common knowledge and thus not
denied and can therefore be assumed to be passively accepted. The important point here is that
such a collective acceptance requires a shared understanding of what is regarded as socially
appropriate or inappropriate among the individuals within a community (Krupka/Weber 2008).
This common understanding is achieved on the basis of a generally accepted set of shared
values.
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make judgments and rank their options and for making a choice of a course of
action.22 What they value thereby shapes their choices; they are not shaped by
what they prefer in these cases.23 Because the underlying rationale for making
judgments of options represents the individual's motives, by using social norms
as evaluative standard, values can become part of what motivates the individual
to choose. Like the agent's option-ranking according to their preferences leads
to an action they have to take if they are instrumentally rational, values can
also make the performance of a kind of behavior normative, i.e. necessary for an
individual.24
Motives shaped by preferences and motives shaped by values are quite distinct
in the sense that two diﬀerent rationales are consulted by the agent for making
his judgment on which he ranks his alternatives and bases his choices.25 In the
latter case, individuals transform their value-orientation into their individual
and collective actions through choice. Here, the agent `reveals' his values by his
conformity.
So there seem to be two dimensions of behavior which are distinct in the
sense that the behaviour is motivated in diﬀerent ways; necessitating choice
and thereby entailing diﬀerent reasons for action. A course of action is taken
either because the agent bases his choice on what his preferences are dictating
him. Or it is taken because an action embodies what he values. In the case of
social norms, people's conformity to them can be one way of revealing what
the individual considers as being the right thing to do. This can conﬂict with
behaviour dictated by his preferences.26 This is important because it shows the
link between people's judgments over options and their motivation that leads to
make choices and the performance of behavior. As the performance of behaviour
is conditioned upon the motives, and motives are shaped by preferences and/or
values, this is why motives determine the dimension of behaviour. And if we
want to capture both dimensions, motives matter in explanation.27
22 Another reason why values inﬂuence choices is that people often take values to be con-
stitutive for the self-conception of their group, of themselves, and of their self-understanding
as autonomous agents (Elster 1989). Beyond mere approval, the individual can even identify
with certain values that are embodied in social norms. In this case, one could say that people
feel committed to these values. Conforming to a norm makes it possible to reveal the agent's
commitments and identity.
23 It is fundamental for the argument here that preferences are assumed to be distinct from
values. This is, however, not a distinction drawn in mainstream economics. For an interesting
discussion of values in economics see e.g. Klamer 2003.
24 This assertion should not be understood as a claim for a causal relation in this context.
Necessity in this sense is to be understood as a requirement of rationality or rational agency.
25 Only to remind the reader: the underlying rationale for making judgment and ranking
options in standard RCT is assumed to be maximization and preference-satisfaction.
26 It can be possible that the behavior which is dictated by one's preference happens to
be the same course of action that represents the agent's values. For example the norm of fair
sharing can improve my utility in a given situation. At the same time it is the case that I am
committed to and identify myself with fairness as a value which makes it necessary for me
to share fairly in every situation independent of the fact that in a particular situation it also
enhances my personal welfare.
27 We want to stress that the type of normativity, i.e. the necessity to take one course of
action rather than another cannot be derived from the consistency-assumptions in this case
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So, why does RCT not accommodate this kind of behaviour? Taking up on
this idea of a social norm being a standard of evaluation for approving behaviour,
the understanding of why people conform to social norms diﬀers signiﬁcantly in
these cases from the notions of agency in standard economics. It would be use-
ful to distinguish between the two dimensions by looking at motives There is
the `instrumental dimension' deriving from the intuitively plausible consistency
requirements; this type is well captured by RCT. The second is a `normative
dimension', which cannot be captured by RCT because the agent does not reve-
al his preferences by making consistent choice in the assumed sense. The agent
rather reveals what he considers as right or wrong based on values he holds as
a member or a group or society. Depending on people's motivation, conformity
is normative for an agent in either one or both of the two senses at the same
time. It depends on the rationale they use for making choice judgments. If in-
dividuals evaluate the option `norm-conformity' in terms of appropriateness or
inappropriateness, they take their values or the social norm as a standard for
evaluation for making their judgment. Again, in this case, to follow a social norm
is normative for a person, i.e. the person recognizes and accepts the normative
claim that that social norm makes on him/her, because the norm embodies the
values the individual or group is committed to. And the acceptance of a certain
normative consideration can mould the way [one] thinks (Millar unpublished, 1)
and acts. What motivates people is indirectly the recognition of the claim that
the norm makes on them and directly their commitment to the values embodied
in that norm. Against the economists' view, personal welfare-improvements and
preference-satisfaction are not the reason for the choice of the agent; they are
not what the agent aims at in the ﬁrst place and thus are not what makes norm-
conformity normative for them (Sen 1977; Hausman 2005). Norm-conformity is
not instrumental in character, but normative in a diﬀerent sense than demanded
by the consistency-requirements for instrumental rationality in RCT.
We suggest that the diﬃculty of RCT to accommodate an action chosen
by judging it as right or wrong, rather than judging it as the most eﬃcient
means to satisfy one's preferences, can be resolved by introducing Amartya Sen's
concept of commitment. As commitment has not been extensively covered in the
RC-literature, we try to give a rough characterization based on commonsense
understandings.28 By looking at Schelling's and Sen's accounts, we will indicate
what a conceptualization and formalization of a motive of commitment would
have to capture. And we will argue that such a concept could play a crucial role
to accommodate the normative dimension of agency.
because the action does not necessarily reveal consistent behavior in the sense assumed by
RCT.
28 We have to admit that an underlying premise of the claim is the empirical statement
that commitment as it will be characterized in this essay does exist. However, to ground this
claim in empirical evidence is a diﬃcult task. There is a lot of empirical research still to be
done on ﬁltering out whether there is such a motivating force as commitment and, if yes, what
its sources are and to disentangle this from other motives. So far, we will just assume that
there is a motive of commitment. For references to empirical evidence see Peter/Schmid 2007;
Sen 2005 and 1987; Kerr et al. 1997 and Kerr/Kaufmann-Gilliland 1994.
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5. The Concept of Commitment
We have argued that, depending on why people think they ought to perform a
certain action and related to the reasons they hold for acting in a certain way, an
action has an instrumental and/or a normative dimension. Acknowledging the
importance of these two dimensions matters, when we aim at explanations and
predictions of individual and social behaviour. Commitment as a motive reﬂects
the main aspects of this normative dimension of agency and hence, could be very
helpful in accounting for the normative dimension of agency.
5.1 What Commitments Are
When we think about commitment, we automatically think about something
that constraints our choices or that brings with it a certain limitation of the
possibility to pursue what we want. We do not necessarily think about some-
thing that we desire to do (Schmid 2007). They do not express what the agent
wants. Rather, if a commitment presents a reason for action this is because
commitments, as Searle puts it, create desire-independent reasons for action
(Searle 2001). We have the intuition that commitments might even exist only
for the purpose of keeping us in line with what we think would be better for
us, were we to distance ourselves from our immediate desires to evaluate our
options; they rather reﬂect what we generally value, instead of what we have a
taste for in a certain moment.29 This clearly reminds us of what we have said
about the normative dimension of agency.
Commitments are often voluntary. Even if we feel them as constraining our
set of options and thereby restraining our choice possibilities, these limitations
are, at least in many cases, self-made. People voluntarily marry; they perceive
themselves as members of a political party or a religion. They are committed to
the company or organization they work for; they pay taxes in the country they
live in; they stick to the realization of ideals such as `sustainable development'
or communism; they go to strikes and demonstrations to realize a common goal
which often, if at all, only indirectly beneﬁts them. People go out and vote,
knowing that their vote will not have a direct eﬀect on the outcome.30
Generally speaking, commitments have an intentional object. They are al-
ways directed towards something, an object of commitment as we will call it
and require a judgment subsequently to choice; a judgment in terms of what the
29 An example would be the individual's upholding or pursuit of the group interest at the
expense of what the individual itself prefers. Collective action for the provision of the public
good is achieved, although the individuals have a strong incentive to free-ride, given their
preferences.
30 The so called `value voters' in the US is a large and important group. Their voting
behaviour derives from their string commitment to the religious values their hold. Their choice
is based on judgments about what they consider as right or wrong, which manifests itself in the
agenda of one party rather than another. It is not manifested in what satisﬁed their preferences
in the moment of the election. Note that this is diﬀerent from the expressive voting account in
which people express their support for one party rather than another. It is also diﬀerent from
the mainstream instrumental account, on which voting is taken as a revelation of preferences
over possible electoral outcomes.
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agent values, not in terms of what best satisﬁes his preferences and maximizes
utility. Many things can serve as an object of commitment. As indicated above,
it could be an ideal, a speciﬁc goal, or a speciﬁc moral or non-moral principle.
What matters, is that our commitments are always about an object and that,
depending on the nature of the object of commitment, our commitments impose
certain restrictions on our behavior. An object of commitment can be the idea
of fairness for example. This value is embodied in our norm of fair sharing. The
commitment to this value requires conformity to the norm in order to imple-
ment our commitments in action. Commitment to fairness provides the agent
with a reason for norm-obedience so to say. But this reason is not instrumen-
tal in nature, because the agent's judgment in such cases is not based on the
principle of instrumental rationality. The agent's performance of the action, i.e.
his conformity to the social norm is independent of his personal situation; it
is independent from his self-interest and his preferences. Commitment provides
practical reasons that are independent of the gains and losses for the person in
case he or she acts on that reason (Pauer-Studer 2007, 75).31
5.2 Theoretical Approaches to Commitment
Very few economists are interested in conceptualizing commitment as a sour-
ce of observable behaviour. Among them are Amartya Sen and Thomas Schel-
ling. Each approaches the topic from slightly diﬀerent angles and they do so
for diﬀerent purposes. A quick outline of their main picture might improve our
understanding of what commitments can be besides the rather intuitive charac-
terization given above.
Schelling wrote extensively about commitment and is even sometimes cre-
dited with having originated the concept. In the ﬁrst essay Strategies of Com-
mitment in his book named Self-Commitment and other Essays (2006), he uses
commitment to refer to phenomena such as becoming committed, bound, or ob-
ligated to some course of action or inaction or to some constraint on future acti-
on. It is relinquishing some options, eliminating some choices, surrendering some
control over one's future behaviour. And it is doing so deliberately, with a pur-
pose. The purpose is to inﬂuence someone else's choices. Commitment does so by
aﬀecting that other's expectations of the committed one's behavior. (Schelling
2006, 1) Thus, Schelling strongly relates commitment to solutions of cooperative
problems. As commitments can easily be broken, devices are necessary to them
credible (e.g. commitments such as threats or promises require devices) credi-
ble, to signal or communicate commitments when we engage in interaction and
31 Note that commitments can change over time in the sense that we change the objects
of our commitments. A member of the German conservative party, being committed to the
values, goals and ideals the party represents, switches to the Green party, because he changes
his objective of commitment to what the green party stands for. However, as commitments
seem to closely relate to what we commonly understand as personal convictions and that they
play a big part in making up one's identity, it is assumed that these changes occur very rarely;
objects of commitments and commitments themselves seem to be much more stable than our
tastes and preferences. This is an important issue. However, its proper discussion would go
beyond the scope of this essay.
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bargaining.32 In Schelling's view, the concept matters for explaining situations
where players have to rely on each other to achieve the maximum beneﬁt (i.e.
collective action problems). For example Schelling claims that a commitment
sometimes lends itself to collective action when people make a common com-
mitment in the case of a strike. Being committed to share one another's strike
burdens is intended to reduce the aggregate burden by enhancing the local's
commitment, and probably does. (2006, 4) In this account, commitments mat-
ter for `coordinating' social action to collectively achieve the maximum beneﬁt
and solve collective action problems.33
Although the view depicted by Schelling covers certain aspects we ascribed
to the motive of commitment, Amartya Sen comes closer to our characteristic
of commitment. His writings help us to demarcate more clearly the concept of
commitment from other motives. In his article Rational Fools: A Critique of the
Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory published in 1977, Sen famously
argues against the reduction of all motives for action as ultimately leading to
preference-satisfaction and maximization. He remarks that the problem with
economic theory is that there is no choice-independent way of understanding
someone's attitude towards alternatives, because there is at least one source of
action that does not involve choice in the usual sense, commitment (Sen 1977,
323).
To introduce his idea, Sen draws on a distinction between the motive of
sympathy and a motive of commitment. Although being a `pro-social' motive,
sympathy does not require a departure from individual utility-maximization.
Similar to acting from sympathy outlined by Kant in his Groundwork of the
Metaphysic of Morals in 1785, an action motivated by sympathy is ultimately
self-regarding, i.e. the concern for others directly aﬀects one's own welfare (Sen
1977, 326). Kant introduced the friend of mankind, who ﬁnds pleasure in sprea-
ding joy around him and who can take delight in the satisfaction of others. But
Kant identiﬁes this kind of satisfaction as an inclination like any other desire a
person can have. The agent performs the action because the action has a positive
impact on his well-being; he does not perform the action because the spread of
joy is in itself a valuable action. He concludes that such an action, even if admi-
rable, has no moral worth (Kant [1785]1997); the agent did not have the proper
32 What is missing in Schelling's account, namely these commitment devices to enforce
commitments and make them credible is given by Robert Frank (1988). He assigns this task
to emotions as commitments cannot be reliably communicated. Emotions fulﬁl this job by
being strategically useful commitment devices and signalling devices for communicating the
adherence of the commitments by an opponent by facial expressions for example.
33 Schelling also talks about self-commitment or self-command in the sense that an indi-
vidual has multiple selves at diﬀerent point in times. There are two or more sets of values
alternately replace each other; or an unchanging array of values is diﬀerentially accessible at
diﬀerent times [...] In common language, a person is not always his usual self; [...] it looks as
if diﬀerent selves took turns, each self wanting its own values to govern what the other self or
selves will do by way of eating, drinking, getting tattooed, speaking its mind, or committing
suicide. (2006, 71) Taking up this metaphor on diﬀerent selves, we can only indicate a relation
of Schelling's idea to our characterization of commitment in saying that one self is motivated
by preference-satisfaction and maximization and the other self judges or ranks his options
according to his values, as mentioned before.
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motivation to make his action to be morally worthy. In contrast, an action which
is motivated by duty has moral worth; it is characterized as an action performed
independently of personal desires and its eﬀect on personal well-being. Kant il-
lustrates this point by describing a philanthropist acting kindly towards others.
He does not have any inclination which would positively or negatively aﬀect his
state of aﬀairs. He simply acts because duty demands it. Being motivated in this
way makes the action genuinely morally worthy from Kant's point of view.
Sen argues that abstracting from one's personal desires and inclinations im-
plies that the action is not driven by them. Rather, an action motivated by
commitment requires a counterpreferential choice from the part of the agent
(Sen 1977, 328).34 This does not require, that the agent is not allowed to have
any kind of additional inclination which makes the action attractive for him. This
just means that under at least one counterfactual condition, the utility expected
by the act chosen would be unaﬀected.35 Hence, the agent would unconditionally
perform the action, i.e. would have no choice in the usual sense. He would still
perform the action, even if he expects negative utility and/or even if it is at the
expense of an alternative action that would make him better oﬀ. Thus, taking
commitment as a possible motive for action, the identity of personal welfare
and individual preferences resulting in choice no longer holds (Sen 1977, 1985
and 2005).36 His commitment makes performing the action necessary for him for
other reasons than preference-satisfaction. That means even if these inclinations
or desires would not be present, he would still perform the action in question.
Personal welfare-improvements are not the reason for the action of the agent;
they are not what the agent aims at in the ﬁrst place (Sen 1977; Hausman 2005).
The requirements of sticking to one's commitment rather present the agent with
a reason to act. However, this reason is normative in character.37
5.3 Commitments and Morality
It seems obvious that there is a close relationship between commitment and
moral agency. According to Kant, acting from duty requires a sense of moral
commitment. Being committed to moral principles is a necessary precondition
34 In this sense, the motive of commitment is to be strictly distinguished from other, socially
orientated, motivations such as altruism, sympathy, among others. Actions motivated by them
are modelled as preferences of the agent and thereby having a positive eﬀect on one's personal
utility. They are motivated by preference-satisfaction. Thereby they result in the maximization
of individual utility and consequently are being revealed by individual behavior.
35 It has to be noticed that it is diﬃcult to imagine diﬀerent states of the world and potential
choices for action. However, we will not discuss this diﬃculty further here but just present the
simple idea of commitment.
36 This identity mainly depends on the underlying understanding of the concept of a pre-
ference or the nature of reasons. As claimed before, personal welfare and individual utility are
(technically) equalled in mainstream economics. This assumption provides the main basis for
conclusions about what we understand as a preference and what the nature of reasons is (Sen
1977 and 1985).
37 What is meant by a normative reason could be understood here as a reason which is
directly provided by the norm. Here, the action is performed for its own sake. This is to be
contrasted with an instrumental reason which is provided by the goal of the agent. Here, the
action is `used' as an instrument.
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for acting from duty. Taking Kant's motive of duty as one `subgroup' of the ge-
neral idea of commitment, Sen's understanding of commitment is that an action
motivated by commitment is per deﬁnitionem independent from the satisfaction
of any kind of inclination or immediate desires the agent is driven by in a given
moment. In the case of commitment, as is the case with actions done from duty,
the agent considers the action as the right thing to do. Consequently, as when
acting from duty, commitment requires the agent to be capable of undertaking
judgment and evaluation, being self-reﬂected and conscious about his values and
principles upon which he bases his evaluations.38
However, although morality implies commitment, morality should not be
equalled or confused with it. Commitment results in the right action, although
this does not necessarily mean that it results in what is seen as morally right.
A healthy lifestyle and ecological awareness can serve as examples: because a
person commits himself to live a healthy life and to protect the environment, he
considers it to be the right thing to do sports and to cultivate his own vegetables.
He takes both actions seriously because they are demanded by her commitment
to these objects, even if sometimes it is rainy and cold outside and he would
prefer to stay at home. Equally, his preference can sometimes also dictate him
to eat fast food. Then he is confronted with a conﬂict between his commitments
and his preferences. And the right thing here is seen as what is dictated by his
commitments. However, doing sports is not morally right. Hence, in the context
of commitment, the right action is deﬁned by the object of the commitment. A
person may also be committed to an ideology, a political party, or a religious
view. A person may be committed to an organisation, to a social contract, to
(moral) principles or to god. All these can be objects one commits oneself to.
Right in this context thus just means that the agent considers the action itself
(or the outcome of the action) as worth pursuing, independent of the personal
beneﬁt he can expect from the outcome of the action. And the agent comes to
know that it is the right thing to do because he evaluates and judges the action
on the basis of the values he holds while comparing possible alternative actions.
He does not draw on the evaluative principle of utility-maximization. In this
sense, an action motivated by commitment is, as a moral action, unconditional
and stable. But it does not necessarily aim at what is the morally right thing to
do.
In sum: the idea of commitment comprises an evaluation of possible alterna-
tives that is not necessarily carried out by basing it on moral values; instead,
it can be based on any set of values the individual in question holds. However,
what commitment has in common with morality, at least understood in a Kan-
tian way, is the existence of a non-welfarist goal that is altogether removed from
individual preference-satisfaction and the fulﬁlment of immediate inclination.
38 The character of commitment strongly depends on the speciﬁc deﬁnition of concepts
used and the speciﬁc `character-traits' considered to be the most important one's for its ﬁnal
conceptualization. Frankfurt-minded philosophers would interpret commitment in a less eva-
luative and a less-cognitive way. According to Frankfurt people do not always know what they
are committed to. Sometimes they believe they are committed to something they actually are
not for example (e.g. Frankfurt 1971). We just use Sen's understanding of commitment here,
which seems very much in line with a Kantian view of moral agency.
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Although commitment as a motive for behaviour is not treated very extensively
in the RC-literature, it is an important motive. It is important because it does
result in behavioural patters diﬀerent from the ones resulting from individual
preference-satisfaction. As already indicated, observed behavioural patterns will
diﬀer in stability of conformity depending on an individual's motivation. This
matters in the case of organizational and incentive design. Workers who conform
to the rules and norms prescribed by their companies out of a personal commit-
ment to their company or to its goals and ideas, for which it stands, will conform
to work norms to bring about these goals and will, at least to a certain extent,
disregard personal interests. The same could be said for members and suppor-
ters of political parties. A person committed to the ideals and overall goals of a
political party will agree more readily to the collective provision of certain public
goods and thus will not attempt to free-ride; thereby, collective action problems
can be avoided without incurring costs. On the contrary, a committed person
might voluntarily punish people who consciously free-ride, even if this entails
having to bear the costs that are incurred. It also matters in case we want to
explain and predict behaviour. The behaviour of a committed person is less ﬂe-
xible, because it is not contingent upon circumstances or changes in preferences.
The economist ﬁnds himself in an explanatory dilemma, as RCT does not allow
for such a concept.
6. Implications
What would be the conceptual and methodological implications of a) acknowled-
ging a normative dimension of agency which has several characteristics distinct
from the instrumental dimension assumed by RCT; and of b) suggesting a con-
ceptualization of the motive of commitment to accommodate the characteristic
features of the normative dimension, which, however contradicts fundamentally
with the behavioural assumption structure assumed in models based on RCT?
We think that there are three ways to deal with this dilemma:
Firstly, many economists simply dismiss the motive of commitment as not
being important, if at all, reducible to preferences. But this is problematic, be-
cause a concept of commitment seems to account for normative phenomena such
certain kinds of norm-conformity, work motivation, solidarity bonds etc. in which
the normative dimension of agency is more deﬁning for the behaviour in question
(Pauer-Studer 2007) and it provides a useful account of cooperation observed in
experimental settings (Kerr et al. 1997).39 Additionally, as Sen himself notes: if
committed behavior is ruled out, then the reasoning that can go into the deter-
mination of choices would be correspondingly impaired. That would hardly be
the way to give reason its due in the idea of rationality in general and rational
choice in particular. (2005, 22ﬀ.)
39 We will not tackle the issue of providing empirical evidence for the existence of a motive
of commitment in this paper. However, we are aware that this is a very delicate and important
issue where a lot more work needs to be done. Interesting empirical literature is provided by
Kerr et al. 1997.
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A second possibility is to ignore the special nature of commitment and just
assume that people have a preference for commitment; these approaches explain
anomalies with as-if models based on long-term calculations and self-interest.
This seems plausible at ﬁrst sight. As mentioned in the ﬁrst part of this article,
economists have elaborated upon their concepts of self-interest and preferences
thanks to the openness and ﬂexibility of the utility-function. However, assuming
a preference for commitment to explain committed behaviour leads to a tauto-
logical explanation, which provides little information. The explanandum, i.e. the
event or fact to be explained is at the same time used as part of the explanans, i.e.
the mechanism which does the explanation. Taking into account diﬀerent types
of (real) motives that people can have instead of reducing them to preferences, we
could avoid basing our explanations on tautological statements and untestable
hypotheses, as allowed by the revealed preference approach underlying RCT.
In addition, assuming a preference for commitment seems as paradoxical con-
sidering our everyday understanding of the concept; even modelling commitment
as an `unconditional preference' does not capture our intuition.40 An action mo-
tivated by commitment does not imply consistent choice. We cannot infer from
the agent's choice that he has chosen the course of action with the highest utility.
Such behaviour cannot be said to reveal our preference ranking because it is ta-
ken independently of how well it satisﬁes our preferences. It is a product of what
our commitments demand. Hence, simply introducing a `taste for commitment'
fails to capture what is distinctive about the nature of commitment, i.e. that it
can override considerations of preference-satisfaction.
The possibility of modelling commitment as an external constraint on the
individual utility function also seems to be problematic in terms of capturing
our commonsense understanding of the concept. People can break their commit-
ments but they cannot remove external constraints such as budget constraints
in mainstream consumer theory; they are externally given (Elster 1990). It is
also questionable whether commitments restrict us in our maximization as they
are self-imposed, or whether we should question the assumption of maximization
altogether in this context.
Conceptualizing commitment as something having unconditional motivating
power over any other preferences, however, also seems to be too strong a charac-
terization. To make the concept more realistic and appealing to empirical rese-
arch, we could investigate degrees of commitment within thresholds. So, when a
starving person has committed himself to a healthy lifestyle and the idea of fair
trade, he might nevertheless go to a fast-food restaurant, trading oﬀ his commit-
ment against his immediate desire deriving from his hunger. But above a certain
threshold (e.g. enough income to eat in the expensive whole-food restaurant)
40 When we talk about an unconditional preference here, the concept is to be understood in
the classical sense of a preference in economics, a binary relation, i.e. and all-things-considered-
ranking (Hausman 2007; Bicchieri 2006), that satisﬁes the required conditions. In this case,
the agent has a preference which is always ranked ﬁrst in his ordering, no matter what other
preferences he has. If I have an unconditional preference for coﬀee for breakfast, I will always
strictly prefer coﬀee to everything else I could have for breakfast. This implies that having coﬀee
for breakfast will always provide me with the greatest pleasure as it satisﬁes my unconditional
preference for coﬀee. Hence, the choice of having coﬀee will maximize my utility.
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he might trade oﬀ desire against commitments; the same holds for tastes. This
threshold level can diﬀer from individual to individual. However, to capture the
general idea of commitment, we would have to assume that the threshold beyond
which someone is willing to compromise commitments is relatively (noticeably)
high.
A third possibility would be to take commitment seriously as a motivatio-
nal force, to admit the explanatory shortcomings of the current framework and
try to adapt it. In this case, the assumption of maximization and preference-
satisfaction, i.e. the consistency-requirements for an instrumentally rationality
choice would have to be relaxed or even rejected (Sen 1982). We defend the
last option. To make use of the potential explanatory advantages of motives, we
must improve the impoverished notion of preference, rethink the minimal requi-
rements of consistency, face the challenge of our notion of reasons consisting of
desires and beliefs that motivate behaviour, and change our understanding of
what it means to act rationally.
7. Concluding Remarks
This article rests on the well-known observation that economists take preferences
to describe behavior rather than people's real motivation. Based on the assump-
tions of revealed preference theory, it is assumed that an agent's motives can
be inferred from observed behaviour in form of a preference for the observed
behaviour that the agent is assumed to have. However, we have argued that real
motives matter. They matter because experimental evidence has shown systema-
tic deviations from the behavioural assumptions of maximization and (narrow)
self-interest. People do in fact have a variety of diﬀerent motives to perform
speciﬁc behaviours, whereby behavioural patterns are conditioned on the nature
of the motives involved and can diﬀer accordingly. The ﬁrst aim of the paper
was to show that discerning diﬀerent motives would provide us with a better
understanding of why people act the way they do and thus to help us making
better explanations and predictions of such behaviour.
Depending on people's motives, behavior can have more than one dimensi-
on. We aimed at showing here that at least an instrumental and a normative
dimension exists. In the ﬁrst case, people's tastes and preferences shape their
motivation. In the second case, we argued that people's values shape their mo-
tivation. We took the example of norm-conformity: conformity to norms has an
`instrumental dimension', which is well captured by the economic framework and
the notion of preferences. But is has also a `normative dimension', which, so the
argument goes, cannot be captured by RCT. Depending on people's motivation,
they consider the conformity to social norms as normative either in one of the
two senses or in both at the same time. We suggested the concept of commitment
as a useful concept to capture this normative dimension of agency.
Motives also matter because experimental result do not tell us why people act
in the way the act. Taking an `as-if-interpretation' of RCT, any behaviour can
be explained by referring to the agents' revealed preferences for that behaviour.
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However, the actual causes of the behaviour and the mechanisms underlying it
are requisite for arriving at useful explanations of behaviour. We are in need of
more sophisticated hypotheses about what goes on in the black box, i.e. what
really people motivates people. To do this we have to pay attention to the
meanings of the concepts we use (and test). (Bicchieri 2006, 19ﬀ.) To deﬁne
our concepts and clearly demarcate them from others, it is useful to know why
people act the way they do. Depending on their motivation, the reasons why
people conform to norms will be diﬀerent and thus the involved normativity, i.e.
why people think they ought to follow the social norm, will diﬀer. With it, the
character of the performed behaviour will diﬀer respectively in terms of long-
term-stability, trade-oﬀ-considerations etc. By trying to outline what character
traits a concept of commitment would need to reﬂect, a second aim of this paper
was to show the diﬃculty economists have in accommodating the concept of
commitment suggested by Amartya Sen.
To overcome the conceptual and explanatory shortcomings of the behavioural
foundations of RCT, we have to consider motives as an important explanatory
tool in social scientiﬁc modelling. It is widely recognized that people's beha-
viour is complex. No theoretical framework will ever cover all of the potential
types of motivations that exist. However, if RCT is to be taken as an explana-
tory enterprise and is expected to provide us with `reasonable explanations' and
predictions of people's behaviour, its main assumption structure should have
empirical content and should, at least to a large extent, represent our observa-
tions in a realistic way. While there is a rapidly increasing literature on motives
such as altruism and reciprocity, there are unfortunately few empirical studies
on the nature of commitment and the character of the behaviour a person mo-
tivated by commitment brings about. To extend the economic model, improve
our utility functions and provide better cognitive and behavioural assumptions
regarding the agents, the acknowledgement of the diﬀerence in the nature of
motives and their irreducibility would be a step in the right direction. Conduc-
ting further theoretical and empirical research in this speciﬁc area is necessary
for constructing a typology of motives. Being able to adequately conceptualize
and formalize the fundamental diﬀerences in distinctively motivated behaviour
is a ﬁrst, but very important step towards improving social scientiﬁc models of
human behaviour based on RCT.
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